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 Abstract 
In a marketing environment, the demand conditions, the costs of shipping and storing 
grain varieties, the interest rate on farm loans, and the distribution of cropland in the area 
are important determinants of growers’ planting decisions. In this article, I focus on a 
market for two quality-differentiated agricultural commodities: one produced with the use 
of biotechnology and the other, without. I develop a model for analyzing the equilibrium 
planting and marketing decisions made by geographically dispersed producers during the 
marketing year following harvest. I identify the types of marketing environments leading 
to a greater concentration of equilibrium acreage planted to a particular grain variety near 
the market and investigate the effects of the marketing environment on the spatial 
patterns of equilibrium land allocation among grain varieties. 
 
Keywords: commodity prices, grain storage, location, marketing, product quality, 
supermodularity. 
 
  
 
LOCATION, PLANTING DECISIONS, AND THE MARKETING OF  
QUALITY-DIFFERENTIATED AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES 
Introduction 
There is an ongoing transformation of many agricultural commodity markets toward 
greater product differentiation. The advent of genetically engineered crop varieties has 
raised a number of consumer concerns about food safety and has created an incentive for 
further product differentiation based on production characteristics. This trend posed a 
challenge for the U.S. bulk commodity marketing system and called for a better 
understanding of the economic reasons behind the adoption of new agricultural 
technologies. Differentiation of commodities based on the extent of genetic modification 
used in production is an important, though clearly not exclusive, example of differentiation 
in grain agriculture and will be of central interest in this study. The goal of this article is to 
investigate the effects that the marketing environment has on the spatial distribution of land 
allocated among quality differentiated grain varieties in a growing region.  
Figure 1 presents some evidence on the variation in the shares of acreage planted to 
non-biotech corn and soybeans across different growing regions (major U.S. crop 
producing states). The shares of planted acreage are plotted against a proxy to the local 
transportation costs given by the adjustments made to the national loan rates for corn and 
soybeans for each state.1 A list of factors influencing acreage allocation at a particular 
location may consist of soil characteristics, various area-specific pest management issues, 
growers’ attitudes about the new technology and assessment of the potential benefits, 
traditional cultivation practices, and other considerations.2 The marketing environment in 
a growing region constitutes another important set of factors determining the pattern of 
land allocation among different crops (e.g., see Lin, Chambers, and Harwood for a 
discussion of marketing biotech and non-biotech grain varieties). In addition to the local 
demand conditions, aspects of a regional marketing environment include the 
transportation costs to the terminal markets for different grain varieties, varietal storage  
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Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture 
 
FIGURE 1. Shares of non-biotech corn and soybeans in producing states plotted 
against loan rate adjustments (cents/bushel), 2001 and 2002 
 
costs, access to credit and credit market conditions, as well as the pattern of concentration 
of cropland in the area.3  
The focus of this article is on the equilibrium spatial distribution of land farmed 
using a conventional process in the presence of a cost-saving technology in a market 
where consumers are willing to pay a premium for the commodity that is costlier to 
produce. Some examples of agricultural product differentiation that begins on the farm 
are products certified as organically grown and/or produced without the use of genetically 
modified seed varieties and which follow identity preservation methods. The issue of 
land allocation among competing crops may be important for policymakers because 
agricultural technologies and production practices, such as pesticide use patterns and soil 
management, may have significant environmental consequences, such as pest resistance, 
impacts on biodiversity and beneficial insects, and other types of externalities (see, e.g., 
Feedstuffs 2002a; Feedstuffs 2002b). These environmental impacts are likely to differ 
across and within producing regions, in part because of the variation in the adoption rates 
(Feedstuffs 2002c). An understanding of how marketing conditions in the area interact 
with the growers’ planting decisions may help policymakers design better policies that 
promote environmentally friendly farming practices.  
In particular, transportation costs in the region are likely to have a bearing on 
growers’ marketing plans and, consequently, on planting decisions.4 Therefore, 
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accounting for the spatial heterogeneity among producers may shed some light on the 
differences in adoption rates across growing areas. Benirschka and Binkley demonstrate 
that in a single commodity market where suppliers are differentiated by location, 
transportation costs determine the optimal pattern of shipping during the marketing year. 
Firms with the lowest transportation costs supply the market first because “a producer 
close to the market has a relatively high opportunity cost of storage, [and] he will store 
commodities only for a short time” (Benirschka and Binkley, p. 515). Frechette and 
Fackler further refine this analysis to study commodity futures price backwardation and 
they introduce additive storage costs. With additive storage costs, the discounted market 
price may rise or fall over time depending on the relative magnitudes of the discount rate, 
the storage costs, and the transportation costs. In a forthcoming article, I use a similar 
model to analyze the distortions caused by government marketing loan programs and 
grower program choice (Saak). I use an extension of this model here to study marketing 
and land allocation decisions in a multi-product setting. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. First, I develop a formal model of a 
two-commodity, multi-period agricultural market with geographically dispersed seasonal 
production. After analyzing possible spatial production patterns, I examine in detail the 
case when the shipping costs are invariant across grain varieties. Next, I investigate the 
determinants of the spatial distribution of the equilibrium land allocation and identify 
conditions under which the concentration of the acreage planted to one variety is ordered 
in a monotone manner by distance to market. Then I study the problem of the 
monopolistic supplier of the cost-saving technology. I conclude with a formal analysis of 
the effects of demand-side uncertainty on the equilibrium spatial acreage allocation.  
 
Model 
Consider a market for two types of commodities: high- and low-quality grain, h  and 
l , that are supplied by producers differentiated by their location ]1,0[∈d  relative to the 
terminal market. The per unit transportation cost from any location is proportional to 
distance (location) d  and is given by deh  and del  for high- and low-quality varieties, 
lh ee ≥ . The cumulative distribution of acres of cropland surrounding the market is given 
by )(dF  where 0)0( =F  and 1)1( =F . At planting, growers decide which variety to 
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grow, and the fraction of acres located at distance d  from the market and allocated to 
high-quality grain is denoted by ]1,0[)( ∈dα . The yields are common across varieties and 
are normalized to unity. The per acre cost of growing the two varieties, hc  and lc , is 
invariant to location, and lh cc > . The focus here is on the planting time growing 
decisions and the intra-year dynamics between the two harvests. Time between the 
harvests is discrete and indexed by Tt ,...,0= , where 0=t  is the harvest time, and Tt =  
is the end of the marketing year. A producer who chooses to sell his crop after harvest at 
0>t  incurs per unit, per period storage costs hw  and lw  for, respectively, high- and 
low-quality grain varieties, lh ww ≥ .5 There is no uncertainty, and producers discount 
future profits at )1,0()1/(1 ∈+= iβ , where 0>i  is the per period risk-free interest rate.6 
The inverse demand functions for two types of grain at the terminal market are given 
by ),( lththht ssPp =  and ),( lthtllt ssPp = , where hts  and lts  are grain supplies delivered to 
the market at time 0≥t . We make the following assumptions about hP and lP : 
 
ASSUMPTION 1. (i) ),(),( lhllhh ssPssP ≥ , )0,()0,( sPsP lh = , ),0(),0( sPsP lh >∞= ; 
(ii) 0<≤ l
s
h
s hh
PP  and 0<≤ h
s
l
s ll
PP . 
 
Here the subscripts denote differentiation. The first condition in (i) says that higher-
quality grain is valued more. The premium vanishes when the supply of low-quality grain 
is small, and the premium becomes very large when the supply of high-quality grain is 
small. Derivative conditions in (ii) state that the two grain varieties are substitutes in 
consumption. Also, the premium decreases with high-quality supply and increases with 
low-quality supply, which is consistent with condition (i).  
Spatial Equilibrium 
At harvest, the present value of the unit profit of the producer located at d  who 
grows grain variety q  and markets his crop at time t  is given by 
 
qqqq
t
t ctWdepqtd −−−= )()(),,( βπ , (1) 
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where )1/()1()(
1
ββββ −−== ∑
=
tqt
i
qiq wwtW  is the harvest time value of the storage 
costs, 0)0( =qW , hlq ,= . 
Each producer chooses the grain variety and the marketing time t  to maximize the 
discounted profit ),,( qtdπ :7 
 ),,(max)(
,
qtdd
tq
ππ = . (2) 
The producer’s problem is naturally decomposed into two steps: (a) the choice of variety 
q , and (b) the choice of the marketing time t . And so, the equilibrium is characterized by 
the function )(* dα , the share of acres that are sown to high-quality grain and located at 
distance d  from the terminal market, and functions )(dth  and )(dtl , the optimal timing 
of marketing for high- and low-quality grain growers. 
Observe that ),,( qtdπ  is supermodular in ),( td : ),,( qtddt π∆∆  qt e)1( ββ −=  0> , 
where ∆  denotes the difference operator.8 Then, from Theorem 2.8.2 in Topkis (p. 77), it 
follows that for any price sequence }{ qtp , )()( dtdt qq ′≤  if dd ′< , where lhq ,= . This 
implies that the set of producers who market their crop at time 0>t  is given by 
],( 1 qtqt dd − , where qtd  is the location of the threshold variety q  grower who is indifferent 
between marketing at t  and 1+t . Hence, per period supplies are given by hts  
∫
−
=
h
t
h
t
d
d
sdFs
1
)()(*α  and ∫
−
−=
l
t
l
t
d
d
l
t sdFss
1
)())(1( *α  where 10 1 ≤<≤ − qTq dd . Note that 
conditions (i) in Assumption 1 assure that in equilibrium qtqt dd <−1 , and 0)(* >dα  for 
some d  in ],( 1 htht dd −  and 1)(* <dα  for some d  in ],( 1 ltlt dd − , so that 0>hts  and 0>lts  
for each Tt ,..,0= . 
Next, we ascertain the possible spatial patterns of high- and low-quality grain 
production. The locations of the threshold producers and the shares of acres sown to each 
variety can be found from equilibrium profit-maximization conditions 
 ),,()),(,( ltdhdtd h ππ ≥  for any 0≥t , if 0)(* >dα  (3a)  
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and 
 ),,()),(,( htdldtd l ππ ≥  for any 0≥t , if 1)(* <dα . (3b) 
The producer profit function optimized with respect to the timing of marketing the crop, 
)),(,( qdtd qπ , is submodular in ),( qd  for all d  if )),(,( qdtd qdq π∆∆  )(dt
lβ−=  
0)( )()( <−− lhdtdt eelhβ , where the envelope theorem is used to perform the 
differentiation.9 Consider two cases: (a) lhT ee >β , and (b) lht ee <β  for some Tt < . 
In case (a), the required submodularity condition clearly holds for all locations, 
0)),(,( <∆∆ qdtd qdq π . Therefore, high-quality grain is produced in the area close to the 
market, 1)(* =dα  for hTdd ≤ , and low-quality grain is produced in the area far away 
from the market, 0)(* =dα  for hTl ddd => −1 . Equilibrium conditions in this case are 
given by 
),1,(),,( htdhtd htht += ππ , 1,...,0 −= Tt , 
),0,(),,( ldhTd hThT ππ = , Tt =  
),1,(),,( ltdltd ltlt += ππ , 1,...,0 −= Tt , 
where )( 00 hh dFs = , )()( 1hththt dFdFs −−=  for Tt ,...,0= , )()( 00 hTll dFdFs −= , and 
)()( 1ltltlt dFdFs −−=  for 1,...,1 −= Tt , )(1 1lTlT dFs −−= . The spatial supply and 
production patterns in the case are depicted in Figure 2. Above the line are the types of 
commodities q  and the time periods when producers located in the interval ),[ 1 qtqt dd −  
supply the market, and below the line is the quantity supplied for each commodity, qts , 
hlq ,= .  
In case (b), the areas of high- and low-quality grain production alternate in some 
range because the submodularity underlying the (weak) inverse relationship between the 
distance and grain quality produced in the area no longer holds. Let z  = 
min{ : }t h lt e eβ < ; then, ),( 1 h zth ztlt ddd +−+∈  for zTt −= ,...,0 . Here all acreage located 
near the market is planted to high-quality variety, 1)(* =dα  for hzdd 1−≤ . However,  
Location, Planting Decisions, and the Marketing of Quality-Differentiated Agricultural Commodities / 7 
 
0 1 
Supply h 
at t=0 hd0  
)( 00 hh dFs =  )()( 011 hhh dFdFs −=  
hd1  
h
Td  ld0  
l
Td 1−  
)()( 00 hTll dFdFs −=  ))(1( 1lTlT dFs −−=  
Supply h 
at t=1 
Supply l 
at t=0 
Supply l 
at t=T 
 
FIGURE 2. Spatial supply and production pattern of grain varieties 
 
moving further from the market, the areas sown to each variety begin to alternate, 
0)(* =dα  for ],( 1 lth zt ddd −+∈ , and 1)(* =dα  for ],( h ztlt ddd +∈ , zTt −= ,...,0 . As 
distance to the market increases, eventually the alternating pattern ceases giving way to 
the plantings of low-quality variety, 0)(* =dα  for hTdd > .10 This follows from no-
arbitrage and profit-maximization conditions (3) and the conditions that in equilibrium 
the supply of each grain variety must be strictly positive at each period. The equilibrium 
locations of the threshold producers }{ htd and }{ ltd  can be found from 
),1,(),,( htdhtd htht += ππ , 2,...,0 −= zt , 
),1,(),,( lztdhtd htht +−= ππ , Tzt ,...,1−= , 
),,(),,( hztdltd ltlt += ππ , zTt −= ,...,0 , 
),1,(),,( ltdltd ltlt += ππ , 1,...,1 −+−= TzTt , 
where )()( 1hththt dFdFs −−=  for 2,...,0 −= zt , )()( l zththt dFdFs −−=  for Tzt ,...,1−= , 
)()( 1h ztltlt dFdFs −+−=  for 1,...,0 +−= zTt , and )()( 1ltltlt dFdFs −−=  for ,2+−= zTt  
...,  T . The spatial supply and production patterns in the case of 1=z  ( hlh eee <<β ) are 
depicted in Figure 3. 
Consequently, when the difference in the transportation costs is not very large, 
namely, if lht ee <β  for some Tt < , there is a range, ],[ 11 h zThz ddd +−−∈ , where areas 
producing high- and low-quality varieties alternate as the distance to the market 
increases. As the discount rate increases, this range narrows, until it disappears when 
lhT ee ≥β . Summarizing, there are two distinct determinants of the spatial distribution of 
production. One is the difference in the transportation costs that makes the areas closer to 
the market more attractive for high-quality grain production. The other is intertemporal 
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0 1 
Supply h 
at t=0 ld0  
)( 00 hh dFs =  
)()( 001 hll dFdFs −=  
hd1  
ld1  
h
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l
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)()( 1lThThT dFdFs −−=  
))(1( hTlT dFs −=  
Supply l 
at t=0 
Supply h 
at t=1 
Supply l 
at t=T 
)()( 011 lhh dFdFs −=  
Supply h 
at t=T 
 
FIGURE 3. Alternating spatial pattern of varietal production 
 
arbitrage opportunities that bring about the optimal marketing decisions (the timing of 
sales) for both types of growers. To better isolate the effects of intertemporal arbitrage on 
the equilibrium spatial distribution of high-quality grain production, consider a special 
but instructive case when the transportation costs from any location are invariant across 
grain varieties.  
For the rest of the article, let eee lh == . Then conditions (3) imply that in 
equilibrium the range of locations that supply the market in a given period is the same for 
each variety: )()()( * dtdtdt lh ==  for all d , and hence, *tltht ddd == . Because in 
equilibrium the distribution of high-quality grain growers within the range ],( ** 1 tt dd −  is 
indeterminate, we can write )1,0()( ** ∈= td αα  where ],( ** 1 tt ddd −∈ . This leads to the 
following: 
 
DEFINITION. Spatial equilibrium is described by the sequences }{ *td  and }{ *tα  such that  
 0)( *1* =−−−− + hthttht wedpedp β , 1,...,0 −= Tt , (4a) 
 0)()1/()1()()( =−−−−−−− lhtlhlthtt ccwwpp ββββ , Tt ,...,0= ,  (4b) 
where )))()()(1()),()((( * 1*** 1** −− −−−= ttttttqqt dFdFdFdFPp αα , 0*1 =−d , 1* =Td , 
Tt ,...,0= , lhq ,= . Figure 4 depicts the spatial supply and production patterns in this 
case. 
Difference equation (4a) has embedded in it the two initial conditions needed to 
determine the solution. A straightforward differentiation of (4b) establishes that each 
given pair of 1−td  and td  uniquely determines tα , which in turn can be used to establish  
Location, Planting Decisions, and the Marketing of Quality-Differentiated Agricultural Commodities / 9 
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FIGURE 4. Spatial supply and production pattern of grain varieties 
 
the monotonicity of the left-hand side of (4a) in 1+td . Therefore, when Assumption 1 
holds, the equilibrium sequences }{ *td  and }{ *tα  that satisfy (4) are uniquely determined 
by the boundary conditions. Furthermore, a plausible assumption is that l lTp e≥  
 ( )l lW T c+ + , i.e., producers at all locations participate in production and supplying the 
terminal market. Note that this is always true if producers are considered in the interval 
]]1,/))(min[(,0[ llllT ecTWp −− . 
Spatial Production Patterns 
It is important to understand how the distribution of acres allocated to high- and low-
quality grain depends on location. As will be shown, in general, no monotone relationship 
between the planting decisions and location can be ascertained. Next is an investigation 
of the implications that equilibrium marketing decisions have for the amounts of grain 
varieties supplied each period. From (4a) it is clear that the market prices for both 
varieties increase over time, qt
q
t pp 1+< , lhq ,= . It is helpful to decompose the total 
change in prices as the share of high-quality grain and total supply change from ),( sα  to 
),( s′′α  where ss <′<′  ,αα , as follows: 
 
)])1(,())1(,([
)])1(,())1(,([))1(,(),(
ssPssP
ssPssPssP
qq
qqq
s
αααα
ααααααα
−−
′
−
′+
′
−
′
−
′′
−
′′=−∆
, lhq ,= . (5) 
While the first square bracket is clearly positive, the sign of the second bracket is 
ambiguous because the supplies of high- and low-quality grain move in opposite 
directions. Suppose that h
s
h
s lh
PP ≤  and l
s
l
s lh
PP ≥ , so that the price of high quality falls and 
the price of low quality rises as the share of high quality increases, 0/ ≤∂∂ thtp α  
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t
l
tp α∂∂≤ / . Then the second bracket is negative for high-quality grain price, htp , and 
positive for low-quality grain price, ltp . Therefore, in this case, the total amount of 
supply must decrease over time, 111 +++ =+>+= t
l
t
h
t
l
t
h
tt ssssss , in order for the market 
prices of both varieties to increase. 
On the other hand, from (4b) it is clear that the premium for high quality increases 
over time: 0))1/())((()( )1( >−+−−−=−∆ −+− lhlhttlthtt ccwwpp ββββ . To 
understand what can be inferred about the behavior of the supply of both varieties, 
decompose the total change in the premium in the manner of (5) into two components. 
One component is attributable to the change in the total amount supplied, and the other is 
attributable to the change in the share of high-quality grain in the total supply: 
 )])1(,())1(,([))1(,(),( ssRssRssRs ααααααα ′−′−′′−′′=−∆  
)])1(,())1(,([ ssRssR αααα −−′−′+ , (6) 
where ))1(,())1(,())1(,( ssPssPsR lh αααααα −−−=− . While the second square 
bracket is clearly positive when condition (ii) in Assumption 1 holds, the sign of the first 
bracket is ambiguous because supplies of both varieties fall and the premium may move 
in either direction. Consider a special case with 0=hsR  and 0>lsR , where the latter 
condition is necessary to assure the uniqueness of equilibrium. Then the sign of the first 
square bracket in (6) is negative because the premium decreases as low-quality grain 
supply falls, ss )1()1( αα ′−<′′− . Therefore, if the total amount of supply decreases over 
time, 1+=′>= tt ssss , the share of high-quality grain must decrease as well, αα =t  
1+=′> tαα , in order for the price premium to rise over time. Furthermore, the share of 
acreage planted to high-quality grain decreases with the distance to the market, 
)(* dα * )(* dtα=  )(** )(* ddt ′=≥ ′ αα , because )()( ** dtdt ′≤  if dd ′< . 
From (5) and (6) it is clear that the change in the total grain supply gives rise to the 
possibility that the share of high-quality grain may rise over time. To isolate this effect, 
for convenience, make the following assumption: 
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ASSUMPTION 2. ))/((),(),( lhhlhllhh sssRssPssP +=−  where 0/)( <∂∂ xxR  for 
]1,0[∈x , ∞=)0(R , and 0)1( =R . 
 
Equation (4b) implies that )))1(,())1(,(( ttttlttttht ssPssP αααα −−−∆  
0)( >∆= tt R α . Therefore, Assumption 2 guarantees that in equilibrium the share of 
high-quality grain marketed each period falls over time, * 1
*
+> tt αα , and space, )(* dα  
)(* d ′≥ α  where dd ′< . Summarizing yields the following: 
 
RESULT 1. (a) Let Assumption 2 hold, or (b) let h
s
h
s lh
PP ≤ , l
s
l
s lh
PP ≥ , 0=− l
s
h
s hh
PP , and 
0>− l
s
h
s ll
PP . Then the share of high-quality grain marketed each period decreases over 
time, * 1
*
+> tt αα , and the share of acreage at each location planted to high-quality grain 
(weakly) decreases with distance, )(* dα  )(* d ′≥ α  where dd ′< . 
 
The following example illustrates that the share of high-quality grain supplied each 
period, *tα , may decrease or increase over time. Also, it is demonstrated that the effect of 
the discount rate on the share of high-quality grain produced at a given location, )(* dα , 
is non-monotone. 
 
EXAMPLE. Let 1=T , ddF =)( , 1=− lh cc , 1== lh ww , 1=e , )(),( lhlhl ssgssP +=  
and hsllhlhh ssssgssP
h
/)()(),( ++= , where 1)( −−<′
h
slsg , ssg /1)( = . 
 
Because here the price of low quality depends only on the total supply, the solution is 
simplified, as the share of high-quality grain and the location of the threshold producer can 
be found separately. Figure 5 depicts the relationship between the shares of acres planted to 
high quality close to ( 0dd ≤ ) and far from the market ( 0dd > ) and the interest rate. 
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FIGURE 5. The shares of high-quality grain and the discount rate 
 
 When the discount rate is small )25.0( <β , the share of high-quality grain supplied 
during the first period exceeds the share of high-quality grain supplied during the second 
period. The situation is reversed as the discount rate becomes larger. Even though the 
total quantity of high-quality grain produced monotonically increases with the discount 
rate, the effect on the share of high-quality grain at a particular location is non-monotone. 
For example, )2.0;8.0(62.064.0)1.0;8.0( ** ===>=== βαβα dd . 
From equation (4b), given that Assumption 2 holds, it is clear that the share of high-
quality grain supplied each period, *tα , decreases with the production and storage cost 
differentials, lh cc −  and lh ww − , and increases with the discount rate, β . Some 
comparative statics results concerning the equilibrium distribution of high-quality grain 
production across space, )(* dα , are derived next. First is an investigation of the effects 
of the transportation and storage costs on planting decisions.  
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RESULT 2. Let Assumption 2 hold. Then (a) the share of high-quality grain produced at 
each location )(* dα  decreases with the transportation cost e , and (b) )(* dα  increases 
with a uniform increase in storage costs, wwwwww llhh +→+→  , , 0>w . 
 
If the equilibrium shares of high-quality grain supplied each period are determined 
in isolation from the total amount of grain supplied, the share and the cumulative 
quantity of high-quality grain at each location (weakly) declines as the transportation 
cost increases. The relationship is reversed if the storage costs for both varieties 
increase by the same amount, because of the different timing of the transportation and 
storage costs. While the transportation cost is typically incurred once (at the time 
immediately preceding the sale), the storage cost is incurred each period and 
accumulates over time. An increase in the transportation cost renders the option to 
delay sale more profitable, and the sets of producers supplying the market at a given 
period shift closer to the market. In contrast, an increase in the storage cost renders the 
option to delay sale less profitable. A subsequent increase in prices in the post-harvest 
period is required to re-establish an incentive to store. Therefore, the sets of producers 
supplying the market at a given period shift away from the market. Because the shares 
of high-quality grain supplied each period are unaffected, the share of high-quality 
grain produced at a given location changes accordingly: it decreases with the 
transportation cost and increases with the storage cost.  
Next is an inquiry into the other determinants of the total amount of high-quality 
grain produced, )(),,;(),,,( 1
0
* zdFwwcczFwwccH lhlhlhlh ∫ −−=−− βαβ , the 
discount rate, β , the production and storage cost differentials, lh cc −  and lh ww − , and 
the distribution of available cropland near the market, )(dF . Let the parameter γ  
parameterize a shift of the acreage, );( γdF , towards the market so that );( γdF  
);( γ ′≤ dF  for all ]1,0[∈d  if γγ ′< . 
 
RESULT 3. (a) Let 0=− l
s
h
s ll
PP  and 0<− l
s
h
s hh
PP , or 0>− l
s
h
s ll
PP  and 0=− l
s
h
s hh
PP .  
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Then the total quantity of high-quality grain H  increases with the discount rate β  and 
decreases with the production and storage cost differentials lh cc −  and lh ww − . (b) Let 
1=T  and let Assumption 2 hold. Then the quantity of high-quality grain H  increases as 
acreage shifts toward the market. 
In general, an increase in the discount rate or in the cost differentials has an 
ambiguous effect because both the locations of the equilibrium threshold producers, *td , 
and the shares of high-quality grain supplied each period, *tα , are affected. Part (a) of the 
result focuses on special cases when the price premium depends on the supply of either 
high- or low-quality grain but not both. Then the share of high-quality grain produced in 
the region responds positively to an increase in the discount rate. In other words, under 
certain conditions, more acres will be planted to high-quality grain in an area with lower 
interest rates on farm loans, and these interest rates are linked to the conditions of local 
credit markets and banking systems. Furthermore, and very intuitively, in areas where the 
added storage and production expenses associated with high-quality grain are smaller, the 
acreage planted to high-quality grain will be greater. 
For part (b) of the result, suppose that the marketing year consists of just two 
periods: harvest-time, 0=t , and post-harvest marketing, 1=t . Suppose also that the 
premium paid for high-quality grain is determined solely by the share of high-quality 
grain in the total supply. Then a shift of the cropland toward the market, possibly 
accompanied by an increase in the total acreage, will cause the number of acres allocated 
to high-quality grain to increase. Therefore, areas where most of the cropland is 
concentrated near the terminal market are likely to grow more high-quality grain than are 
similar areas where the acreage available for planting is distributed more uniformly. 
Endogenous Production Cost Differential 
The new agricultural technology (e.g., cost-saving genetically modified seeds) is 
often supplied by or patented and subsequently licensed to distributors by a single 
company.11 In such cases, the cost differential is likely composed of two parts: 
rrcc flh −=− .12 Here r  is the price charged by the technology supplier, and 0>fr  is 
the cost savings arising because of the use of the technology on farms and not (directly) 
controlled by the patent holder, frr ≤ . Both of these costs are taken to be common 
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among all growers. The demand for the cost-saving seed is equal to the number of acres 
farmed using the new technology, H−1 . Of interest is how the revenue of the 
technology supplier responds to the changes in the production and marketing 
environments. The monopolist’s revenue gross of production costs (that are either sunk or 
normalized to zero) is 
 ))(1(  max rHr
r
M
−=Π . (7) 
Results 2 and 3 can be readily used to infer the following regarding the revenue accrued 
to the new technology supplier: 
 
RESULT 4. (a) Let 0=− l
s
h
s ll
PP  and 0<− l
s
h
s hh
PP , or 0>− l
s
h
s ll
PP  and 0=− l
s
h
s hh
PP .  
 
Then the monopolist’s revenue MΠ  increases when the discount rate β  falls, and the 
farm production and storage cost differentials, fr  and lh ww − , rise. For (b)-(d), let 
Assumption 2 hold. Then MΠ  increases with (b) an increase in the transportation cost e , 
and with (c) a uniform decrease in the storage costs wwwwww llhh −→−→  , , 0>w ; 
(d) In addition, let 1=T . Then MΠ  increases as the acreage shifts away from the market.  
Therefore, it is likely that the cost-saving seed supplier will be more interested in 
promoting the new technology in a region with less-developed credit markets (a higher 
interest rate on farm loans), and where the cost-savings from the use of the technology 
are greater in both production and subsequent storing. While not modeled formally, this 
immediately implies that a greater probability of comingling of the two grain varieties 
that takes away the value of the high-quality commodity plays into the monopolist’s 
hand, as it increases the difference in storage costs. Also, the cost-saving seed supplier 
may prefer an area with higher transportation costs and a greater (cheaper) storage 
capacity. In addition, an area where the concentration of cropland occurs relatively far 
from a terminal market is also more likely to be targeted by the new seed supplier.  
In general, there is no guarantee that problem (7) is well behaved and has a unique 
solution. However, if one of the conditions in Result 4, part (a) holds, and in addition, if 
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0=−= l
ss
h
ssss lhlhlh
PPR  and 0>−= l
ss
h
ssss hhhhhh
PPR , or 0=lhssR  and ll ssR  l l
h
s s
P=  
 0l lls sP− > , respectively, it can be readily verified that there is a unique 
*r  that maximizes 
the monopolist’s revenue. Consider some of the determinants of the cost differential set 
by the monopolistic technology supplier in this case: 
 
RESULT 5. Let (a) 0),( <lh
s
ssR h , 0),( =lhs ssR l , 0),( =lhss ssR lh , 0),( >lhss ssR hh , or 
(b) 0),( >lh
s
ssR l , 0),( =lhs ssR h , 0),( =lhss ssR lh , 0),( >lhss ssR ll  for all 0, >lh ss .  
 
Then the optimal technology fee charged by the monopolist *r  increases with the storage 
cost differential, lh ww − , and with the farm cost savings in production provided by the 
new technology, fr . 
Under certain conditions concerning the price premium for varieties produced using 
conventional farming practices, the price of the cost-saving seed is likely to be higher in a 
growing area where the benefits of the new technology are more pronounced relative to 
another, otherwise similar, growing area where the potential cost-savings are lower. Also, 
an increase in the added storage expense of the conventional grain variety leads to an 
optimal upward adjustment of the technology fee. 
The next subsection inquires into how the introduction of the demand-side 
uncertainty affects the equilibrium planting and marketing decisions across space. 
Uncertainty 
In a general case, the analysis of the effects of uncertainty on equilibrium planting 
decisions is complicated because of the interaction between the marketing decisions and 
the uncertainty regarding the future demand conditions that unfold each period as the 
marketing year progresses. To simplify the analysis, consider a special but illustrative 
case with two marketing periods: harvest-time, 0=t , and post-harvest, 1=t . 
Furthermore, for the rest of this section, assume the following. The distribution of 
cropland in the growing area is concentrated in just two points: at 0=d , an area close to 
the market, and at dd = , an area far away from the market, so that fdF =)( , dd < , 
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and 1)( =dF . To focus on the effects of uncertainty arising because of intertemporal and 
spatial arbitrage and not because of the way the uncertainty enters the demand functions, 
it is held that t
l
t
h
t
hh
t ssPp θ+= ),(  and ),( lthtllt ssPp = , where 0θ  and 1θ  are identically 
independently distributed (i.i.d.) random shocks. The resolved uncertainty regarding 0θ  
may affect the price of the low-quality variety ltp  only through the marketing decisions 
of the high-quality variety growers made at harvest since the two grain varieties are 
substitutes in consumption. To simplify notation, let 1=e  and www lh == . 
It is instructive to first investigate the case with no uncertainty, )ˆPr( 0 θθ =  
1)ˆPr( 1 === θθ . Consider equilibrium where all growers located near the market at 
0=d  supply the market at harvest, 0=t , ),0,0( qtd ==π  ),1,0( qtd ==> π , hlq ,= , 
and all growers far away from the market at dd =  supply the market after the harvest, 
1=t , ),0,(),1,( qtddqtdd ==>== ππ , hlq ,= . The shares of acres sown to high-
quality grain at each location, *0α  and *1α , adjust until producers are indifferent between 
growing either variety, ),0,0(),0,0( ltdhtd ===== ππ  and ),1,( htdd ==π  
),1,( ltdd === π , or 
 
tlhl
t
h
t ccpp
−
−=− β)( , 1,0=t , (8) 
 dwppwp qqq )1()()( 101 βββ −+−≤≤− , hlq ,= , (9) 
where fs h *00 α= , =ls0 f)1( *0α− , )1(*11 fs h −= α , and )1)(1( *11 fs l −−= α . Clearly, one 
can always pick the storage cost, w , and the transportation cost, d , such that these 
conditions hold. 
Turning back to the analysis under uncertainty, let 0θ  and 1θ  be i.i.d. random 
variables with the expectations given by θθθ ˆ10 == EE , and consider equilibrium 
marketing decisions made at 0=t  after the uncertainty regarding 0θ  is resolved. Denote 
by ),( *1*0 ααθ  and ),( *1*0 ααθ  the realizations of 0θ  such that the intertemporal arbitrage 
may take place: 
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)ˆ))1)(1(),1((())1(,( *1*1*0*0 wffPffP hh −+−−−=+− θααβθαα , and 
dwffPffP hh )1()ˆ))1)(1(),1((())1(,( *1*1*0*0 βθααβθαα −+−+−−−=+− . 
Then, at time 0, for any θθ <0 , some of the high-quality growers at 0=d  will choose to 
supply at 1=t , and their number, 00 >x , is given by 
)ˆ))1)(1(,)1((())1(,( *10*10*00*0 wfxfPfxfP hh −+−−+−=+−− θααβθαα , 
where it is held that low-quality growers far away from the market at dd =  have no 
incentive to market their crop at 0=t : 
 dwfxfPfxfP ll )1()))1)(1(,)1((())1(,( *10*1*00*0 βααβαα −+−−−+−≤−− . (10) 
While for any θθ >0 , some of the high-quality growers at dd =  will choose to supply 
at 0=t , and their number, 01 >x , is given by  
dwfxfPfxfP hh )1()ˆ))1)(1(,)1((())1(,( *11*10*01*0 βθααβθαα −+−+−−−−=+−+  
where it is held that low-quality growers near the market at 0=d  have no incentive to 
delay marketing their crop until 1=t : 
 )))1)(1(,)1((())1(,( *11*1*01*0 wfxfPfxfP ll −−−−−≥−+ ααβαα . (11) 
Therefore, the resultant price premium for the high-quality variety looks as depicted 
in Figure 6 given that 0=−= l
ss
h
ssss hhhhhh
PPR , so that the change in the curvature is solely 
attributable to the intertemporal arbitrage opportunities exercised by high-quality 
growers. The effect of the random shock on the price of the high-quality variety at 
harvest is smoothed out because of the possibility of the intertemporal arbitrage by the 
high-quality grain growers at each location. Figure 6 suggests that an increase in 
uncertainty has an ambiguous effect on the expected price premium because the curvature 
of the premium is non-monotone in 0θ . On the one hand, the premium is (weakly) 
convex around θ , the lower bound of the “no-arbitrage” range of the values of the 
random shock 0θ , where some high-quality growers near the market may choose to delay 
marketing. On the other hand, the premium is (weakly) concave around the upper bound 
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0θθ  θ  
 
FIGURE 6. Price premium under uncertainty 
 
of the “no-arbitrage” range, θ , where some high-quality growers far away from the 
market may choose to market their crop at harvest. The following verifies this intuition. 
For simplicity, it is held that the random demand shocks have a two-point distribu-
tion: εθθ −= ˆt  with probability 5.0 , and εθθ += ˆt  with probability 5.0 , 1,0=t ,  
where 0≥ε . Then an increase in ε  constitutes an increase in uncertainty regarding the 
demand for the high-quality variety. When εθθεθ −≤≤+ ˆ , a small increase in 
uncertainty has no effect on the equilibrium planting decisions. Suppose that εθθ <−ˆ  
θθ ˆ−< , so that the negative shock to the demand for high-quality variety at harvest 
renders it profitable (in expectation) for the high-quality grain growers near the market to 
delay marketing until after the harvest. In planting time equilibrium, the shares of high-
quality grain produced at each location adjust until ),,(max htdE
t
π  ),,(max ltdE
t
π= , 
for dd  ,0= , where the expectation is based on the information available at planting. 
Then, equilibrium is given by ( *0*1*0  , , xαα ) such that 
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tlhl
t
h
t ccppE
−
−=− β)(}{ , 1,0=t ,  (12) 
)ˆ))1)(1(,)1(((ˆ))1(,( *1*0*1*0*0*0 wfxfPfxfP hh −+−−+−=−+−− θααβεθαα , (13) 
where θααθεααθθ ˆ),(),(ˆ *1*0*1*0 −<<− , ))1(,([5.0}{ *0*0*000 fxfRppE lh αα −−=−  
]ˆ))1(,([5.0]ˆ *0*0 εθααεθ ++−+−+ ffR ,  ))1(,)1((5.0}{ *0*0*111 fxfRppE lh αα −+−=−  
θαα ˆ))1)(1(),1((5.0 *1*1 +−−−+ ffR , and condition (10) holds. 
From (12) it follows that the equilibrium share of high-quality acres near (far from) 
the market increases (decreases) with the extent of the intertemportal arbitrage by the 
high-quality growers near the market, 0x : 0/ 0
*
0 ≥∂∂ xα  and 0/ 0*1 ≤∂∂ xα . This, upon 
differentiating (13), yields 0/0 >∂∂ εx  if ),(),( lhhslhhs ssPssP lh >  for all 0, >lh ss . In 
other words, an increase in the magnitude of the negative demand shock will cause a 
greater share of high-quality growers near the market to delay marketing until after the 
harvest. Consequently, the shares of high-quality grain production in the areas close to 
the market and far away from the market move in opposite directions as uncertainty 
increases, 0/*0 ≥∂∂ εα  and 0/*1 ≤∂∂ εα . Next, consider the case with θθεθθ −<<− ˆˆ  
when the positive shock to the demand for high-quality variety at harvest renders it 
profitable (in expectation) for the high-quality grain growers located far away from the 
market to market their crop at harvest-time. An analysis similar to that in the previous 
case shows that the response of equilibrium shares of acres planted to high-quality grain 
in the areas near and far from the market is reversed: 0/*0 ≤∂∂ εα  and 0/*1 ≥∂∂ εα  if 
),( lhh
s
ssP h  ),( lhhs ssP l>  for all 0, >lh ss . Summarizing gives the following: 
 
RESULT 6. An increase in uncertainty may increase or decrease the share acres sown to 
high-quality grain variety at each location. Namely, let ),(),( lhh
s
lhh
s
ssPssP lh >  for all 
0, >lh ss .  
 
Suppose there is an increase in uncertainty regarding the value of tθ . Then the share of 
acres allocated to high-quality variety near (far away from) the market increases 
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(decreases) 0/*0 ≥∂∂ εα  and 0/*1 ≤∂∂ εα  if θθεθθ ˆˆ −<<− , and conversely, 
0/*0 ≤∂∂ εα  and 0/*1 ≥∂∂ εα  if θθεθθ −<<− ˆˆ . 
 
Conclusions 
This article presents an investigation of the effects of the marketing environment on 
the acreage allocation among multiple crops in a growing area. The study analyzes 
equilibrium planting and marketing decisions during the marketing year between the two 
harvests in a market for two quality differentiated agricultural commodities with 
geographically dispersed producers. The study includes the important case of a market for 
grains differentiated based on the genetically modified (GM) content present in the seed. 
Such differentiation typically requires additional expenses in grain processing, including 
storing and transportation, in order to assure identity preservation of the non-GM crop. The 
elements of the marketing environment studied here are demand conditions, the costs of 
shipping and storing grain varieties, the state of agricultural credit markets (summarized by 
the interest rate on farm loans), and the distribution of cropland in the area. 
While most statements about the precise spatial pattern of equilibrium land allocation 
among the grain varieties require a detailed knowledge about the environment, it is 
interesting that a higher cost of shipping or storing a non-GM crop (high-quality grain 
variety) will not necessarily cause all of non-GM acreage to concentrate near the market. 
Several conditions on the behavior of demand for grain varieties under which the 
concentration of non-GM acreage occurs near the market are identified. Also, the study 
illustrates that the costs of shipping and storing grain may have counteracting effects on 
the spatial pattern of equilibrium planting decisions because of the different timing within 
the marketing year for these two types of expenses. Some of the determinants of the 
revenue and the price of (GM) cost-saving seeds charged by the monopolistic seed 
supplier are investigated. Upon the introduction of demand uncertainty, the study 
demonstrates that the equilibrium effects of uncertainty on the extent of the concentration 
of non-GM acreage near the market are ambiguous. 
Whereas this article emphasized the spatial heterogeneity among producers, the 
producer heterogeneities in varietal storage and transportation costs, planting costs, benefits 
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derived from using a particular variety and past farming practices, risk attitudes, discount 
rates, and access to credit are other essential features of the agricultural environment. For 
example, in light of the previous analysis, the incentives to invest in additional on-farm or 
off-farm storage capacity required for a cost-effective product differentiation may differ 
across locations. In particular, it may turn out that farmers located in the middle of the 
growing area where transportation costs are moderate will have the greatest incentive to 
expand storage capacity, allowing for better crop identity preservation. Both theoretical and 
empirical understanding of marketing and planting decisions in the presence of producer 
heterogeneities is likely to provide valuable policy insights. 
  
Endnotes 
1. This measure of transportation costs ignores the variability in the cost of shipping 
grain within a state.  
2. There is a large literature concerned with the motives behind the adoption of 
agricultural biotechnology. For example, the effects of uncertainty about consumer 
attitudes toward genetically modified foods on equilibrium acreage planted to non-
modified varieties are studied in Saak and Hennessy. The motives based on the 
added flexibility in pest management in the context of heterogeneous susceptibility 
to infestation across farms are investigated in Hennessy and Saak. Hubbell, Marra, 
and Carlson, and Lapan and Moschini study grower adoption of biotechnology in 
other contexts.  
3. For example, Bullock, Desquilbet, and Nitsi discuss and provide many empirical 
estimates of price premiums and identity preservation costs for non-biotech grain 
varieties, including the costs of purity testing, shipping, and segregation in various 
stages of the food supply chain. 
4. To better focus on the interaction between the marketing environment and planting 
decisions, the planting costs are assumed to be invariant across locations in what 
follows.  
5. Under a typical commercial storage contract, a producer is charged a fee accrued 
during the first three to six months even if the grain is removed from storage before 
that. This and other kinds of fixed storage costs are not considered explicitly. 
Accounting for them would complicate the notation without changing the nature of 
the results. 
6. The likely heterogeneity in the discount rates among producers is potentially 
important but is not modeled here.  
7. For simplicity, I ignore the time elapsed between planting and harvesting the crop. 
8. The theory of comparative statics that relies on properties such as supermodularity 
and single crossing is developed in Topkis, Milgrom and Shannon, and Athey, 
among others. A function on a suitable domain is supermodular if increasing one 
variable increases the incremental return to another variable. This concept is 
intimately related to the important economic notion of complementarity. 
9. If a function f−  is supermodular, then f is said to be submodular. 
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10. I exclude the case with z h le eβ =  for some 0z >  as a zero probability event except 
for the case with h le e= . The analysis in these cases is parallel to the analysis when 
h le e=  because there is also h lt z td d+ =  for 0,...,t T z= − . 
11. According to some estimates, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service—the 
arm of the U.S. Department of Agriculture responsible for regulating transgenic 
plants—reviews about 1,000 applications from biotechnology companies each year 
(Feedstuffs 2002a). 
12. The case in which agricultural technology improves the output characteristics of the 
product can be analyzed in a similar manner. Then one can write h l fc c r r− = + , 
and the technology supplier’s revenue is  ( )M rH rΠ = .
  
Appendix 
Proof of Result 2. (a) First, establish that );();( ** eded ′≥ αα  for all d  if ee ′≤ . 
From Assumption 2 it follows that 0/* =∂∂ etα . Suppose that tt dd >′  for some t . Let 
0≥= it  be the first time that this happens. Then <−=
−
))()(( 1iiihi dFdFs α  
’
1 )()(( hiiii sdFdF =′−′ −α  and <−−= − ))()()(1( 1iiili dFdFs α  )()()(1( 1−′−′− iii dFdFα  
’l
is= , and hence ),( lihihhi ssPp = ),( ’’’, lihihhi ssPp => , because 11 −− ≤′ ii dd  by assumption.  
Also, from equilibrium conditions at it =  it follows that 
hh
i
h
ii wppde βββ +−=−′′ +’,1’,)1(  )1(’,1 βββ −=+−> + ihhihi edwpp , which, rearranging, 
yields ’,’,11 )( hihihihi pppp −>− ++β  0> . Because hip 1+  ),( 11 lihi ssP ++= ),( ’1’1’,1 lihihi ssPp +++ => , 
and hence, <−= +++ ))()(( 111 iiihi dFdFs α ’111 )()(( hiiii sdFdF +++ =′−′α  and lis 1+  
<−−= ++ ))()()(1( 11 iii dFdFα ’111 )()()(1( liiii sdFdF +++ =′−′−α , along with ii dd >′ , it 
follows that 11 ++ >′ ii dd . From equilibrium conditions at 1+= it  it follows that 
h
iii wppde βββ +′−′=−′′ +++ 211 )1(  )1(121 βββ −=+−> +++ ihii edwpp , and 
0)( ’,11’,22 >−>− ++++ hihihihi ppppβ . Continuing in this fashion, 11 −− >′ TT dd  is obtained and 
)))(1)(1()),(1(( 11 −− −−−= TTTThhT dFdFPp αα  )),(1(( 1’, −′−=> TThhT dFPp α  
)))(1)(1( 1−′−− TT dFα  which is impossible. Therefore, it follows that tt dd ≤′  for all t  
when ee ′≤ . Consequently, * );(
*
);(
*
**);( edtedted ′≥= ααα  );(* ed ′= α  because 
);();( ** edtedt ′≤  for all d , and * 1* +> tt αα  from Result 1, part (a).  
(b) Next, establish that ),;(),;( ** wwwwdwwd lhlh ++≤ αα  for all d  if 0>w . 
The proof is similar to that of part (a). From Assumption 2 it follows that 0/* =∂∂ wtα . It 
can also be shown that an increase in storage costs, www hh +=’,  and www ll +=’, ,  
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implies that tt dd ≥′  for all t , and hence ),;(),;( ’,’,** lhlh wwdtwwdt ≥  for all d . And so, 
),;(),;( ’,’,** lhlh wwdwwd αα ≤ . 
 
Proof of Result 3. (a) First, establish that )()( ββ ′< HH  if ββ ′<  and 
)()( φφ ′> HH  if φφ ′< , where lhlh wwcc −−= ,φ . Suppose that 0=− l
s
h
s ll
PP  and 
0<− l
s
h
s hh
PP . Differentiating (4b) it follows that 
β∂∂ /hts 2)1/()1)1)1(()([( βββ −+−−−−= − tww tlh  0)/()( 1 >−−+ −− lshstlh hh PPtcc β ,  
)(/ lhht ccs −∂∂ 0)/( <−= − lshst hh PPβ , and )(/ lhht wws −∂∂  
0)])(1/[()1( <−−−= l
s
h
s
t
hh PPβββ , where )()(( * 1** −−= tttht dFdFs α . And so, 
∑
=
=
T
t
h
tsH 0 )()( ββ )()(0 ββ ′=′< ∑ = HsTt ht , and ∑ == Tt htsH 0 )()( φφ  
)()(
0
φφ ′=′> ∑
=
HsT
t
h
t . Now suppose that 0>−
l
s
h
s ll
PP  and 0=− l
s
h
s hh
PP . Following the 
same steps yields β∂∂ /lts 0< ,  )(/ lhlt ccs −∂∂ 0> , and )(/ lhlt wws −∂∂ 0> . 
Consequently, ∑
=
−=
T
t
l
tsH 0 )(1)( ββ  )()(1 0 ββ ′=′−< ∑ = HsTt lt , and 
∑
=
−=
T
t
l
tsH 0 )(1)( φφ  )()(1 0 φφ ′=′−> ∑ = HsTt lt . 
(b) Next, establish that )()( γγ ′≤ HH  if γγ ′< . Differentiating (4a) when 1=T  
yields: 
0
//*0 dGGd γγ −=∂∂ , where *0 ]/([ thq spG αγ ∂∂= ))1](/[ *0 tlq sp α−∂∂+  
*
11 ]/([ αβ hq sp ∂∂+ )()))1](/[ *0*11 dFsp lq γα−∂∂+ 0≤ , =0dG  )1()(/)( *0*0 βγγ −−dFdfG  
0< . And so, 
0
/)1(/));(( *0 dGFdF γβγγγ −−=∂∂  0≥ . Write the quantity of high quality 
grain as )(γH *1*0*1*0 ))(()( αγαα +−= dF . Hence, γγ ∂∂ /)(H  )( *1*0 αα −=  
0/));(({ *0 ≥∂∂ γγγdF . 
 
Proof of Result 4. All parts are proved similar and follow from Results 2 and 3, and 
the possibility of choosing a new price of the technology, r , after the change in the 
environment. Let φ  denote the parameter in question, γβφ ,,,,, wewwr lhf −= . Then,  
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write ))),((1)(()( ** φφφφ rHrM −=Π ))),((1)(( ** φφφ ′−≤ rHr  )(* φ′≤ r  
))),((1( * φφ ′′− rH  )(φ′Π= M . 
 
Proof of Result 5. To show that (a) 0)(/* >−∂∂ lh wwr ; (b) 0/* >∂∂ frr , it must be 
established that ),,( flhM rwwr −Π ∑∑
==
=−=−=
T
t
l
t
T
t
h
t srsrHr 00 )1()1(  is 
supermodular in ),( lh wwr −  and ),( frr . Differentiating (4b) twice under condition (1) 
and using Result 3 yields rwws lhht ∂−∂∂ )(/2 0)(/2 <−∂∂= −− lhhtssst wwsRR hhhβ  and 
0)(/)(/)1(
0
22 >∂−∂∂−=∂−∂−∂ ∑
=
T
t
lhh
t
lh
rwwsrwwH , while using condition (2) and 
Result 3 yields rwws lhlt ∂−∂∂ )(/2 0)(/2 >−∂∂= −− lhltssst wwsRR lllβ  and 
0)(/)1(2 >∂−∂−∂ rwwH lh . And so, if either condition (1) or (2) holds, then 
)(/)1()(/2 lhlh wwHwwr −∂−∂=−∂∂Π∂  )(/)1(2 lh wwrHr −∂∂−∂+ 0> . The 
supermodularity of the profit function in ),( frr  follows immediately from the second-
order conditions of the maximization problem. 
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